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This paper deals with various versions of finite propositional probabilistic 
dynamic logic. We present probabilistic propositional dynamic logic with simple 
probabilistic estimations and “almost regular” program language Besides the logics 
previously introduced in the literature we present some natural variations and 
extensions of these logics. We investigate the (un)decidability of these logics and 
give a complete picture of decidability and undecidability. Some of these logics have 
the finite model property, and therefore. if they are undecidable, they are exactly 
f7:. We show that allowing nesting and probabilistic choice often leads to 
undecidability. 8 1991 Academic Press, Inc 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with various versions of finite propositional 
probabilistic logic (PPDL). The basic dynamic construct is estimating 
a probability that a program CI will terminate in a state satisfying a 
condition p. 
The exact way we want to speak about probabilities may vary. We study 
three basic versions of PPDL: 
(1) Deterministic PPDL (DPPDL), introduced in Feldman (1984a), 
where only deterministic regular expressions c1 appear as program con- 
structs and boolean combinations of propositional variables p are allowed. 
However, for estimating probabilities we can use first order formulas of 
real closed fields. 
(2) Rational PPDL (PPDL > r), introduced in Tiomkin and 
Makowsky (1983), where we can say about the probabilities only that they 
are greater than a rational constant r. 
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(3) Positive PPDL (PPDL >O) is like rational PPDL where the 
only estimation we talk about is that the probability is greater than 0. 
Clearly, probabilistic estimations of (3) are a special case of (2), and 
those of (2) are a special case of (1). In Feldman (1984a) it is proved that 
DPPDL is decidable, and in a similar way we can easily show the 
decidability of determinsitic PPDL>r and PPDL>O without nesting of 
probabilistic estimations. The question we want to ask in this paper is 
whether the logic remains decidable when we allow nesting of probabilistic 
estimations (e.g., “rich test”) or add additional constructs such as global 
assignment and probabilistic choice. 
In the case of DPPDL the addition of global assignment does not make 
the resulting logic undecidable, but adding probabilistic choice or nesting 
does make it undecidable (see Sections 5 and 6). In the case of PPDL > r 
we show exactly the same (un)decidability results as in DPPDL, whereas 
in the case of PPDL > 0 all the extensions remain decidable because of its 
equivalence to the usual PDL. 
In spirit our investigation is similar to that in Harel, Pneuli, and Stavi 
(1983). There it was shown that adding context free program constructs 
makes propositional dynamic logic undecidable. Here, adding either 
nesting or probabilistic choice already makes PPDL > r undecidable, 
though it has very poor probability estimations. This shows that, as in the 
case of PDL, the decidability of rather simple probabilistic logics is very 
sensitive to the choice of permissible program constructs. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give the basic formal 
definitions and state our results formally. In Section 3 we show that 
PPDL > 0 is reducible to PDL. In Section 4 we collect some model 
theoretic results for PPDL > r. In Section 5 we deal with extensions of 
DPPDL. In Section 6 we present the undecidability results for PPDL > r. 
We use there the undecidability result for probabilistic automata, due to 
Paz (1971). In the Appendix we show the undecidability of the logic 
introduced in Kozen (1985) when we allow boolean combinations of 
inequalities. 
2. DEFINITIONS AND MAIN RESULTS 
2.1 Language Definition 
A signature CJ is a triple { {Pi}iso, {~j},Eu~ (qkjkeo), where (P~},~~ is 
a set of propositional variables, (u,}~~, is a set of program variables, and 
{qkel!few is a set of global propositional variables. The global propositional 
variables (cf. Meyer and Winklman (1982), and Tiomkin and Makowsky 
(1985)) serve us as internal boolean variables in programs. It was shown 
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in Tiomkin and Makowsky (1985) that these variables do not extend 
Dynamic Logic by much. For a countable signature cr and a tuple xyz 
(x, y, z = 0, 1) we define a language PPDL,,,,,. We define simultaneously 
the sets of formulas (Fm,,,,) and program terms (Pr,,,.;) of PPDL,,,, 
(x= 1 means that the language allows global assignments, y= 1 
probabilistic choice, and z = 1 nesting of probabilistic estimations). We 
shall sometimes omit Q. 
(a) If pi is a propositional variable, then pi E Fm,,,,; if 01~ is a program 
variable, then aj E Pr,‘: ; if qk is a global propositional variable, then 
qk E Fmrvz and qk := true, qk := false E PPDL, yz; 
(b) true, false E Fm,.=; if cp, Ic/ E Fk.,.,, then cp 8~ rcI, cp v ti, 
cp = II/ E Fm,,,,; 
(c) if c~i, . . . . N,E Pr,i;, ri, . . . . r, are nonnegative real numbers with 
CiZ; ri d 1, then (rla, u ... u r,a,)EPr,,;; this program chooses ran- 
domly between c(, , . . . . U, with the probabilities r,, . . . . r,; 
(d) if cp E Fm,,.,, i is a nonnegative real number < 1, and CI E Pr.XYz, 
then (c( ) dcp E Fmxyl ; if cp does not contain a “diamond” (( )), then 
(m) ,?cp E Fm,,; the meaning of this formula is that the probability of cp 
after the execution of c1 is greater than i; 
(e) if cp E Fm,,,,, and a, j? E Pr.Xyz, then (a; /I) E Pr.X.V.,v- and (cp?), (if q CI 
else p), (while q CL)E Pr,,,i. If q, a, and /I do not contain a “diamond” 
(( )), then (cp?), (if cp h else /I), (while cp CI)E Pr,.;. We write (if cp c() 
instead of (if cp M else true?). 
Note that the logic without nesting is simpler than the customary 
dynamic logic with “poor” test, because in the logic with “poor” test a 
program term cannot contain “diamonds,” but there may be nesting of 
“diamonds” in a formula. 
2.2. Semantics for PPDL 
Here we consider programs as transition probabilities on the space of 
“events” (a state with values of global variables), as it is described in Neveu 
(1964). It is assumed that a reader is familiar with measure theory and 
Lebesgue integral on arbitrary measure (definitions and fundamental 
properties). 
Let D be some nonempty domain and S a a-algebra on 2D. We define 
a set Meas as a set of all a-additive nonnegative measures on S with a 
measure of D < 1. A function f: D + Meas is a program image on S, if 
for each V E S /zI. f(I)( V) is a measurable function on S. 
Composition of program images is defined componentwise by the 
integral (f 0 g)(l)(U) = SD g(J)(U) dr&, and multiplication by non- 
negative number 2 and the (countable) sum of program images are also 
DECIDABILITY OF PROBABILISTIC LOGICS 183 
defined componentwise provided that the corresponding measures on D 
will not be > 1. 
Using these properties we can assign program images as meanings of 
program variables, measurable sets as meanings of propositional variables, 
and give an inductive definition of meaning of a program term and (or) a 
formula of PPDL, in a model M= (D, S, {P,}, {f,}), where D is a non- 
empty domain, SE 2” is a a-algebra on D, Pi E S are the meanings of 
propositional variables, andf, are program images on S which serve us as 
the meanings of program variables. If G is a countable set of global 
propositional variables, then the extended model is defined as in Tiomkin 
(1983) and Tiomkin and Makowsky (1983): 
MC= (DC, S”, {PC}, {fzj), where 
D”=Dx2”, 
SC c 2DG is a o-algebra, which is generated by the sets {U x {z E 2”: 
z(qk)=O}: UES, qkEG}, 
P,G=P,x25 
f~((l,z))(U)=f,(l)({J~D: (J,z)~U}Fatomic programs do 
not change global variables. 
We define for a formula cp and a program term a with global variables 
only from G their “meanings” qG E SC and f,“, a program image on SC, by 
simultaneous induction on cp and CC 
p,“= Pp, trueG = DG, false” = 0, 
cPw)G=(pGNG, (cp v $)G=~Gu$G, l(~~=D~\(p~, 
if (Z,z)~Uncp~ 
otherwise, 
f (“r,,,” vr,z,) = ,g, rif E. 
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For qk E G we define 
if (4z(q,/l))~U 
otherwise, 
if (Az(q,IO))~ U 
otherwise. 
Now we prove that this notion is well defined. 
PROPOSITION 2.2.1. For a model M, a formula cp, and a program term LY 
of PPDL,, where G, H are sets of global variables from o, the following 
hold: 
1. (Pi E SG, f ,” is a program image on SG, if they are defined. 
2. Zf G c H, and G contains all the global variables of cp and c(, then 
(P”={(Z,~)ED~: (Z,z,&~(p~}, 
f :((Z, z))(u)=f:((I, z,G),({ (Z, =;G> : (J, Z’> E u>,. 
The proof is by induction on cp and c(. 
We say that (Z, z ) FM q if (I, z ) belongs to cpG, A4 k cp if for some 
G qG = DG, and k=pr cp if for every M we have A4 k cp. By Proposition 2.2.1, 
if for some G qG = DG, then for every H, (P” = D” when it is defined. 
2.3. Primitive Formulas 
In this subsection we define a normal form used to facilitate structural 
induction on the formulas from PPDL (e.g., in the proof of Proposi- 
tion 4.4). 
DEFINITION 2.3.1. A formula cp of PPDL is finitary primitive (or fpf) if 
it is built from program and propositional variables using only logical 
connectives and probabilistic diamonds with rational probabilities. 
THEOREM 2.3.2. Every formula cp of PPDL is equivalent (semantically) 
to some (may be infkitary) boolean combination of finitary primitive 
formulas. The translation is recursive. 
Proof This is proved by induction on a formula and the proof uses 
a set of valid (not always finite) PPDL formulas which serve also as 
examples for valid formulas (the numbers r and s run over rational 
numbers): 
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(0) (K) l$ -false, 
(i) (CI) W- V <a> r*, i<t-<I 
(ii) ($?) Aq = $ & cp, for A< 1, 
(iii) (if $ cI else fi) rcP-(~~(cr)rcp)&(lICI~((P>rcp), 
(iv) (c(;p)r(p- V ii (cOr,((P>SicP&l(B>Si+140), 
0 <r,. . rn < 1 i= I 
o<u,< .,. <A”+,=1 
r,s,+ ... +r,s,>r 
(v) (r,rx, u ... u r,ff,) k(p- V &t <Xi> sicp, 
o<s,,...,s,c 1 i=l 
r,>,+ ... +r,s.zi. 
(vi) (p := S) icp = cp(p 1 S), if cp does not contain assignment to p 
and I < 1. S is true or false, 
(vii) (while $a) rq = V ii ((Vi a)‘; iti?> r,v, 
r c ro + + r,= I i= 0 
(viii) (c1)r V (pn=V (a)r \li q,, 
,I n i= I 
(ix) (cr)r&cp,- V & (Cos Bt (pi. 
n .S>I n i= I 
The proof of (iv) follows immediately from the definition of the Lebesgue 
integral, and the proof of (vii), (viii), and (ix) uses o-additivity of the 
corresponding measures. 1 
2.4. The Restricted Probability Estimations 
We define PPDL > 0 a language where the only allowed probabilistic 
estimation (the diamond) is > 0. We shall see later that this restriction 
affects the decidability of PPDL. We shall call PPDL > r a language where 
the ony numbers in the estimations and probabilistic choice are the 
rational numbers. In such a language the formulas are constructive objects, 
and we can talk about decidability of its validity problem. 
2.5. the ( UnJdecidability of Different Versions of PPDL 
We present here a table which contains the (un)decidability results about 
different probabilistic propositional dynamic logics. The proofs will follow. 
The “ + ” means decidability of the validity problem. The “ -” means 
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undecidability of the validity problem and non-existence of a recursive 
proof system (the set of valid formulas is not recursively enumerable). 
1NE NE 
1sw SW 
1CH CH 1CH CH 
DPPDL + - + - ~ 
PPDL>O + + + + + 
PPDL>r + - + - - 
Here “NE” means “with nesting of probability estimations” (z = l), 
“SW’ means “with global assingments (switching)” (X = l), and “CH” 
means “with probabilistic choice” (y = 1). In the case of NE all combina- 
tions of SW and CH give the same decidability results. DPPDL is the logic 
proposed by Feldman (1984a). In this logic only deterministic programs 
are allowed, and probabilistic estimations are allowed only on events which 
are boolean combinations of propositional variables. In spite of this, the 
estimations can be delined by any formula with arithmetic operations and 
quantifiers over real numbers. We can extend this logic by allowing global 
assignments, nesting, and probabilistic choice, as we show in Section 5. 
3. INTERINTERPRETABILITY OF PDL AND PPDL > 0 
PDL formulas and programs are built from the propositional and 
program variables by allowing finite boolean operations for formulas, com- 
position, nondeterministic choice, and star (nondeterministic iteration) for 
programs and ( ) (diamond) without probability (see Fisher and Ladner 
(1979)). PDL + GA is the extension of PDL by the addition of global 
assignments. In Tiomkin and Makowsky (1985), Appendix, it was shown 
that every formula from PDL + GA is equivalent to a formula from PDL. 
In order to show mutual interpretability of the logics PPDL > 0 and 
PDL, we, unfortunately, have to go through several stages. First we have 
to replace the programing primitives while, if by expressions involving *, 
u, and tests. In the next stage we eliminate the use of global variables. 
After this we can reduce PPDL >O to PDL by just dropping the 
probability numbers in the PPDL > 0 formulas. 
DEFINITION 3.1. We define in PPDL > 0 U* as (q, := true; while 
qi(rl CI u r2qi := false)), where qi is some new global variable and rl, rz are 
some randomly chosen numbers such that rl, r2 > 0, r, + rz Q 1. 
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DEFINITION 3.2. We build a translation tr from PPDL > 0 to PPDL > 0 
with only v , *, ;, ., 7 := as program constructs, by induction on a formula 
and a program term. This tr is the identity on the propositional and 
program variables and commutes with the boolean operations, diamond 
( ( ) ), choice ( u ), test (?), and composition of programs (;). 
The only nontrivial steps of the definition are 
(while cp a)” = ((cp”?; a”)*; lcp”?) 
(if cp ccelseP)“= (r,(cp”?; ~l’~)ur~(icp~~?; p”)) 
for some randomly chosen rl , r2 > 0, r, + r2 6 1. 
LEMMA 3.3. For a formula rp and a program term CI from PPDL > 0, a 
model M, IED, UES 
fM(NW'O iff fgtr( I)( U) > 0 
Ikcp iff I /= q”. 
Proof By induction on a and cp. 
DEFINITION AND LEMMA 3.4. For a global variable qi, a program term LX, 
and a formula cp from PPDL > 0 with v , *, ;, ?, := as the program con- 
structs, we construct four program terms and two formulae aiiCi, j=O,,,, 
‘pici = 0,, , without qi and additional global variables, as was done in Tiomkin 
and Makowsky (1985, Theorem A.2). For a model M, IE DC, UE SG it will 
be 
if Z+ qi, then Ij= (p-(p,, f,(Z)(U)>0 iff 
f,,,(~)(UnqC)>Oorf,,,(~)(Un(iq,)")>O. 
if I k lqi, then I + cp = qo, f,(Z)(U) > 0 iff 
f,,,U)(UnqC)>O orfi,(Z)(Un(i4i)G)>0. 
The lemma and the proof are similar to Theorem A.2 in Tiomkin and 
Makowsky (1985). Note that cp is a valid formula iff cp, & cpO is, because 
cpl and ‘pO do not contain qt. 
DEFINITION AND LEMMA 3.5. We build a translation trr from the 
formulas of PPDL > 0 to PPDL > 0 with only u, *, ;, ? as program 
constructs, such that 
For a formula cp we take I+G” = cp”, and for a global variable q in $” we take 
‘b n+l = $7 & i+!r;f as in the Definition 3.4. So $“+ ’ will be equivalent to $” 
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from the point of view of validity (by Lemma 3.4) while having fewer global 
variables. Obviously, the validity of $I” is equivalent to that of cp 61) 
Lemma 3.3. For $” without global variables at all we take vi” = $k which 
will be equivalent to cp. 
DEFINITION 3.6. We construct a translation trrr from PPDL>O, with 
only u, *. ;, ? as program constructs, to PDL by dropping all the 
numbers. 
PROPOSITION 3.7. The translations trrr preserves validity; i.e., cp is a valid 
PPDL > 0 formula iff cp trrr is a valid PDL formula. 
Proof: The proof uses the finite model property of PDL and its 
axiomatiation (see Gabbay (unpublished) and Fisher and Ladner (1979)). 
We have two cases to consider: 
1. kPDL(P trrr. Then there is finite model A4 with state K, such that 
K k,,,, @I*. From such M we construct a natural probabilistic model M 
with the same domain and predicate values, and for the program variables 
we define 
f,VW)= 
the number of JE U, such that R, (Z)(J) 
PI 
(here a a-algebra is the algebra of all subsets of the finite domain D). We 
prove by induction on $ and c1 that I + ,,,, I)“” iff I b M $, and f,(I)( U) > 0 
iff Rxtrrr(Z)(.Z) for some JE U. Then we have M k cp, and k pr cp. 
2. kPDL~ trrr. Then it is provable in some axiom system (see Gabbay 
(unpublished) or Pratt (1978)). We write down here the axioms and rules 






all propositional tautologies, modus ponens, 
clip’ 
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The translations of the axioms are valid in PPDL > 0, the translations 
of the rules are admissible rules of PPDL > 0, and we prove k pr cp by 
induction on the proof of q’“’ in PDL. 1 
COROLLARY 3.8. The logic PPDL > 0 is decidable. 
Proof: This follows from the decidability of PDL (Fisher and Ladner, 
1979) and the fact that for a formula cp from PPDL>O the PDL formula 
(PY will be valid iff 40 is valid (by Lemma 3.5 and Proposition 3.7) and 
all the translations we used are recursive. 1 
Remark. We proved that PPDL >O is interpretable in PDL. We can 
easily show the opposite, i.e., that PDL is interpretable in PPDL > 0. Note 
that the translation trrr is reversible-we can change the PDL diamond 
( ) to the probabilistic one ( )O, and add any possible positive rational 
numbers to the probabilistic choice expressions. The obtained formula will 
belong to PPDL > 0, and by Proposition 3.7 this translation preserves 
validity. 
4. DISCRETE AND FINITE MODELS OF PPDL 
Note that if we want some computability we have to deal with finite 
models and finite formulas of PPDL. Here we do it. We assume that cr is 
some finite signature (a set of propositional and program variables) for 
PPDL. 
DEFINITION 4.1. We say that a model M of PPDL is a finite model if 
its domain is finite. M is a finite rational model if it is finite and all the 
values f,(l)(U) for IE D, UE S, and a from 0 are rational numbers. 
We shall see that it is not so complicated to check satisfiability of a finite 
formula in a finite rational model. The proof is an easy exercise in the 
theory of Markov chains, and we are very grateful to a referee who pointed 
out that a somewhat stronger result was independently proved by Parikh 
and Mahoney (1984). Note also that similar methods were used by Sharir, 
Pnueli, and Hart (1984) for verification of probabilistic programs with 
countable sets of states. 
PROPOSITION 4.2. There exists a polynomial aIgorithm which decides 
I k M rp for a finite rational model M, a state I of M, and a formula cp from 
PPDL > r. 
ProoJ We construct an iterative algorithm which builds the sets U, 
and the transition probabilities f, for all the subformulas I,!J and program 
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terms c( from cp. The only interesting case is a program term a = (while $ /?), 
where U, and fD are already known. It is easy to see that, for ZE U,, , 
f,(Z)({Z}) = 1 and fJZ)( {J}) =0 for J#Z. For ZE U, f,(J)({Z})=O. So 
the important case is f,(Z)( {J}) for ZE U,, JE U,,. 
For ZE U, we use the well known facts from the theory of finite Markov 
chains (see Kemeny and Snell (1960)). We construct a Markov chain from 
the transition probability fi. First of all we make all the states from U,, 
absorbing. At this step we should know that f,(Z)( .)=O for every ergodic 
state from U,. We delete all these states. We add one new absorbing state 
in order to make the living probability 1. 
After that we can already compute the probabilities to go from a 
transient state Z from U, to an absorbing state J- {b,J} = NR, where the 
matrix (L i ) is the transition matrix of the chaim (I is the unit matrix) and 
N = (I- Q) ~ ’ is the fundamental matrix (see Kemeny and Snell (1960)). 
All these operations may be done in polynomial time. 1 
Remark. Note that all the transition probabilities f,(Z)( {J}) computed 
in Proposition 4.2 are rational--even for complicated CI. 
Now we show that all the logics PPDL,,,,, i.e., logics without nesting, 
have the finite model property. In other words their validity problem is not 
as complicated as one might think. The proof will be long, but the idea is 
trivial. We use the fact that a regular program is a limit of finite programs. 
The same idea was also used in Feldman (1984) and Parikh and Mahoney 
(1984) to prove similar results. 
Here we should deal with some countable signature 0’ consisting of 
program variables czi , . . . . c(,, . . . . N <w is the set of finite sequences of natural 
numbers. 
DEFINITION 4.3. We say that a model of PPDL is a quasi-tree model if 
its domain D=ulreN<” D,, the sets {D,} are disjoint, D, is not empty 
(/i is the empty sequence), and for every ZE D,, i E N we have 
fa, (Z)(Dpi) = fm, (Z)(D). 
We say that a set D, is a root of the quasi-tree model. 
PROPOSITION 4.4. For a model M and a state Z from M there exists a 
quasi-tree model M’ and a state I’ from the root of M’ such that for every 
formula cp from PPDL,,, 
Z+,cp iff Z’+=,,cp. 
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Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of existence of a tree model for 
PDL. We construct a model M’ as follows: 
D’=DxN’“, D,=Dx {P}, 
S’ is a g-algebra generated by S on D and by the algebra 
of all subsets on N cw, 
P;=PixNCW, 
fh,((J, P))(U) = fa,(J)(~D(Dpi n W), where nD is a 
projection from the product on D. 
We take I’= (I, ,4) and prove easily that M’ is a quasi-tree model 
and I’ belongs to the root. After that we prove by induction on fpi cp (cf. 
Definition 2.3.1) that for every JE D, p E N <w 
The interesting case of induction is cp = (txi) Q. Then Ui = U, x N <” 
by the inductive assumption, and f%,( (J, p))( Ui) =f,,(.I)(n,(Dfii n U$)) 
= f,,(J)( 17,). Then we prove the Proposition by the Theorem 2.3.2, 
because every formula is equivalent to an infinite boolean combination 
of fpfs. 
DEFINITION 4.5. For a quasi-tree model A4= {D, S, . ..} and a natural 
number n we define a submodel of depth n, M, = {D”, S”, . ..}. as a model 
generated by sequences from N <w of length 6 n. Note that this M, will be 
also a quasi-tree model. 
PROPOSITION 4.6. For a quasi-tree model M, a state IE D, a program 
term c( without diamonds (probabilistic estimations), and a set UE S the 
following holds (h(I) = min(k: IE ok)): 
(a) f,““(I)(UnD”)<f,M”+i(I)(UnD”*‘)fornZh(I), 
(b) lim,,, f?(I)( Un D”) = f,“U)( W. 
ProoJ We prove by induction on a program term o! that f, = 
Ck rnx.fiky where the program terms CQ do not contain diamonds, choices, 
ifs, and while’s, and 0 d r,, d 1. These program terms are compositions of 
program variables, assignments, and simple tests. For such a term c(~ 
denote by dk a number of appearances of program variables in it. Then it 
will be fc(I)( Un D”) = 0 or undelined for every n < h(I) + dk, and 
fz(I)(Un D”)=fF(I)(U) for every n> h(I) +dk. Thus (a) and (b) 
follow easily for such program terms. Also, it follows for an u from 
192 TIOMKIN AND MAKOWSKY 
PPDL,O by taking the sum of corresponding expressions, because this sum 
is absolutely converging. 
PROPOSITION 4.7 (Finite depth property). For a quasi-tree model M, a 
formula cp from PPDL,,, (without nesting of “diamonds”) and a state 
IED~, ifIk=,cp thenforsomen>O, Ib,,,“p 
Proof We prove from Proposition 4.6 that for every appearance of 
<Co W in cp, if I + M (a) ,I$ then for each sufficiently large n, 
I k,w. (a) W. Also, if I+Mi(a)2$ then for each n, 
Ihfn 1(a) Q. I 
DEFINITION 4.8. A quasi-tree model M is a tree model if M, is finite for 
every n. 
PROPOSITION 4.9. For a finite signature rs, a model M, and a state Ifrom 
M there exist a tree model M’ and a state I’ from the root of M’ such that 
for every formula cp from PPDL,,,,, 
I t= M cp iff I’ k M, cp. 
Proof Assume that the finite signature c consists of the program 
variables c1 1, . . . . CI, and the propositional variables p1 , . . . , pk. We define the 
set of formulas F= {&f= I vipi: vi is 1 or nothing} and the set of program 
terms A = {(true?; cli, ; qJ, ?; . . . . c(~,; qj,?): Ia 0, aj, are the program variables, 
qj, E F). 
We construct a model M’ as follows: 
D’ = A, 
s’ = p, 
(true?) kM,pi iff I kMpi, 
( . cl,; vi?) k M, pi if pi appears positively in ‘p,, 
f,,(a)(((a; at; Cpi?))) =f(z,,;,.?,(I)(D)/f ,“(I)(D), and =0 in all other 
cases. We assume here O/O = 0. 
This model is a tree model. 
After that we take I’= true? and prove that for C(E A f,“(I)(D) = 
f r’(I’)(D’). Then we can already prove the proposition using the fact that 
for a program term /I without ( ) we have fp(I)(D) = C,“= 1 rkf,,(I)(D), 
where ak E A (each formula (j?) i1(1 is equivalent to (fi; $?),I true, so the 
equivalence for ffl(I)(D) is sufficient). [ 
PROPOSITION 4.10. For a formula cp from PPDL,,,,, if q is satisfiable 
then it is satisfiable in a finite (tree) model. 
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Proof: If cp is satisfiable, then by Proposition 4.9 it is satisfiable in the 
roof of some tree model M. By Proposition 4.7 it is satisfiable in the root 
of M, for some n > 0. It will be a finite model by Definition 4.8. 1 
Now we are able to change irrational probabilities in a finite model while 
preserving the satisfiability of a formula. 
DEFINITION 4.11. For a finite model M, a program variable CI from the 
signature cr, two states Z, J of a model, and a number E > 0 we define a 
finite model M(I, J, ~1, E) as a model with the same domain as in h4, where 
“f, M(‘*J.‘.c)(Z)( {J)) =f”“(Z)( {J}) -E. The values of propositional variables 
and all other probabiities are the same. 
PROPOSITION 4.12. Suppose that A4 is a finite model, t( is a program 
variable, and p is a program term without ( >. For the states I, J, K, L of 
A4 with f,(Z)( { J>) = p > 0, denoting M(Z, J, cx, E) by ME, we have 
(a) ~~(K)(~L})~~~“(K)((L})~~~OQ~~&EP~ 
(b) lim,,,f~(K)({L1)=fpM(K)({L)). 
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4.6 and uses the 
fact that f,(K)( {L)) is a positive (may be infinite) algebraic expression 
containing f,, (I)( {J} ). i 
Now we can already prove the existence of a finite rational model. 
THEOREM 4.13 (Finite model property for PPDL without nesting). Zf a 
formula cp from PPDL,,,, is satisfiable then it is satisfiable in a finite 
rational (tree) model. 
Proof: If cp is satisfiable, then by Proposition 4.10 it is satisfiable in 
some finite (tree) model, and so by Proposition 4.12 we can change the 
probabilities in this model slightly, making it a finite rational (tree) model 
while preserving the truth of cp. 1 
5. EXTENSIONS OF DPPDL 
In this section we discuss DPPDL, introduced in Feldman (1984a), and 
its variations. We interpret PPDL,, in DPPDL,; this result connects 
between validity problems in both logics. We modify the result of Feldman 
(1984a) that DPPDL,, is decidable to obtain the decidability of 
DPPDL,,,, which immediately gives decidability of PPDL,. We then 
establish the undecidabilty of DPPDL,, . The undecidability of DPPDLo,o 
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follows from undecidability of PPDLolO, and this is proved later, at the end 
of Section 6. 
The logic proposed in the work of Feldman is the first order logic of real 
numbers with deterministic regular programs and probabilistic estimations 
on events which are boolean combinations of propositional variables. The 
main constructs in the language are Fr(P), the “frequency” of an event P, 
and (z} 1+5, a formula II/ is true after execution of a program a. The seman- 
tics of a program state is a nonnegative measure on B c-algebra, and the 
semantics of a program is a nonincreasing measure transformer. As was 
pointed out by Kozen (1985), this semantics is equivalent to ours. Detining 
by CJ~ the point measure on {K} with CJ~({K))= 1, we have for the 
program image p(a) in WI P(~NP)(S) =JD f,(K)(S) d,K and.f,(J)(S) = 
p(ol)(o,)(S). We denote the logic from Feldman (1984a) by DPPDLooo. 
Naturally, we can extend DPPDL,,, as usual, to all the variations 
DPPDL,,,, allowing asignments to global variables, probabilistic choice, 
and nesting. E.g., in the logic with nesting we allow events containing for- 
mulas with frequencies and “( ).” Note that in DPPDL a propositional 
variable is not a formula. The semantics is somewhat similar to that 
defmed for PPDL in Section 2. For a model M with a domain D and a 
countable set of global variables G, we extend the domain D to 
DC = D x 2’, adding assignments for global variables, exactly as we did 
that in Section 2. Note that one cannot define P(U), the measure transfor- 
mer of a program term CC, or t(q) 5 DG, the “meaning” of a formula cp, for 
c( and cp with complicated tests, independently of the initial distribution ~1; 
cf. (Iii) and (iv) below. So, for logic with nesting, we have to define p,(a) 
and r,(q) by simultaneous induction on a program term c( and a formula 
(an event) cp. Also, the measure transformer corresponding to a program 
term with complicated tests will not necessarily be linear. The definition is 
similar to that in Feldman (1984a) for DPPDL,,; we give here the impor- 
tant parts of the definition. Note also that a for a formula cp t,(p) is either 
the whole domain O”, or the empty set (0). U*(t)(pt) is Ihe value of a 
term r in a measure p (see Feldman, 1984a, p. 15). 
(i) pp(ra u sB) = v,(a) + v,(8), 
(Ii) pp(qk := ~;.‘.)(V)(U)=V({(J,Z)EU:Z(qk)=~)) 
+v({u,4qk/w: u5,-ku,z(qk)=;}), 
(iii) z,(tl = f2)= 
DG, if u*(t,)(p) = u*(MPL) 
o 
otherwise, 
(iv) TJf, < FZ) = 
dG, if u*(r,Hfl) -=z q:(f*)(P) 
!a, otherwise, 
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(v) T,(VXcpb)) 
i 
DG,if t,(cp(x)) = DC for every assignment of a real number to .Y 
= 0, otherwise, 
(vi) z,((Co-cp)=~~,,(~)(~,((~), 
(vii) PJu; P)(v) = p,,cg,c,,,(P)(p,(a)(v)), 
(viii) p,(if cp c1 else /?)(v)(U) 
=p,,(cr)(V)(UnT,(cp))+p,,(P)(V)(UnT,,(lcp)). 
Of course, for a measure p we define p j= cp iff z,(q) = D”. 
Similarly to Feldman (1984, Section 5) we prove the standard normal 
form property for the DPPDL,,, program terms which is the probabilistic 
version of the usual normal form for a regular program term in Dynamic 
Logic (cf. Harel, 1979). 
PROPOSITION 5.1. For a DPPDL I,.0 program term CI and fixed values c~j 
global variables we have 
1. P,(~)(D) = CreB r,p,(TW), where B is the set of basic execution 
sequences consisting of tests and program variables (cf: Feldman, 1984a. and 
Harel, 1979) and r, are nonnegative real numbers. 
2. For a program term without probabilistic choice, r, are only 0 or 1, 
and R(u) = {T: r, = 1). is (deterministic) regular in the alphabet of primitive 
tests and program variables (cf: Feldman, 1984a). 
ProoJ: First, we extend the set of primitive tests and variables with 
global variables tests and assignments. We prove 1 and 2 for this set by 
indution on a program term. 
Then we observe that an extended execution sequence is equivalent to 
the empty one (p(z) = 0) if it contains inconsistent assignments and tests of 
global variables, otherwise we can remove these assignments and tests 
without any change in p(r)(D). This immediately implies 1. 
In order to prove 2 we notice that for a basic execution sequence r we 
can construct a model M, based on its prefixes, with the natural measure 
transformers passing to the next state, and the initial point measure p(r 
defined on the minimal prefix. In this model we have pT(D) = 1 and 
p(f)(D) = 1 for every prefix 7’ of z. We observe that the value of p(s) on 
a basic execution sequence is the sum of the values of the extended execu- 
tion sequences, and so rr is a natural number. However, it cannot be > 1 
because then p(a) will be measure increasing in M,. Also, if T' is a proper 
prefix of z, then rr. or rr must be equal to 0, otherwise p(a) will be measure 
increasing in M,. 1 
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DEFINITION 5.2. We define translation of a program term c1 from 
PPJXwo to a program term cc! from DPPDL,,., by changing ? to ! (! is a 
test construct in DPPDL). The translation of a formula cp from PPDL.,., 
to a formula cp! from DPPDL,,,, is done by changing every (a) j$ to 
{!I! )- Fr($) > i, and a single variable p to Fr(p) = 1. 
Note that PPDL formulas deal with programs starting in one state, 
whereas DPPDL ones deal with some initial probability distribution on the 
program states. Therefore, for a finite signature r~ with propositional 
variables p 1, . . . . P,, we write down the following DPPDL formula 
expressing that the events are initially discrete and the measure of the 
whole domain is 1: 
Disc,=(Fr(true)= l&k (Fr(p,)= 1) v (Fr(lp,)= 1). 
i= 1 
Now we extend Lemma 8 from Feldman (1984a) (the tree model 
property) to the logic with global variables and deterministic choice. 
PROPOSITION 5.3. A DPPDL,,O formula is satisfiable if and only if it is 
satisfiable in a tree model (cj Definitions 5 and 7 from Feldman, 1984a). 
ProoJ: By Proposition 5.2, it is sufficient to show that for every model 
there exists a tree model where the values of the basic execution sequences 
will be the same. This is exactly Lemma 6 from Feldman (1984a). 1 
THEOREM 5.4. A formula cp from PPDL,,,, is satisfiable if and onlv if the 
formula Disc & cp! from DPPDL,,, is. 
Proof: 1. Z t= M cp. Then in the same model for the point measure (rl 
we have CT, + Disc & cp! in DPPDL. The proof is by induction on cp, and 
by Proposition 4.10 we can assume that M is a finite (tree) model. 
2. Disc & cp! is satisfiable. Then by Proposition 5.3 it is satisfiable in 
a tree model from Feldman (1984a). The initial measure in such a model 
is defined on different events (cf. the definition of v in (Feldman, 1984a, 
Lemma 6)). Therefore the truth of Disc implies that this measure will be 
some point measure oI defined on a state I. Then in PPDL we have Z k cp 
in the same model. The proof is by induction on cp. 1 
PROPOSITION 5.5. DPPDL,,, is decidable. 
ProoJ Proposition 5.1 implies that the proof in Feldman (1984a, Part 
5) can be carried through even after the extension of DPPDL by global 
assignments. For any possible initial values of global variables, we can 
change the program terms of a formula to the corresponding sets of basic 
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execution sequences. In particular, one should note that programs with 
global assignments remain deterministic (cf. Proposition 5.1), and therefore 
Lemmas 14 and 19 in Feldman (1984a) remain true. 1 
THEOREM 5.6. Validity in Second Order Arithmetic, i.e., the theory of 
the natural numbers and predicates on the natural numbers, is reducible to 
validity in DPPDLoo,, DPPDL with nesting, and, therefore, DPPDL,, is 
highly undecidable. 
ProoJ: We can define the natural numbers in DPPDL with nesting in 
the following way: we define a formula 
cp(.u) = {while 1 ({cz}(Fr(P) = x)) Fr(true) > 0. 
This formula says that after several iterations of a program a Fr(P) is 
equal to x. It really defines a nonincreasing sequence of nonnegative real 
numbers. After that the formula 
cp( 1) & VX Vy((x X )‘+ y = x) = (V(X) = cp( y))) 
defines the natural numbers, because this formula is satisfiable, and if it is 
true there will be cp( l/x) if and onl-v if x is a natural number greater than 
0. The reason is that cp( l/.x) for a noninteger x implies cp( l/y) for a negative 
y which is impossible. Also, we have in DPPDL quantifiers over the real 
numbers, and it is well known that real numbers and predicates on natural 
numbers may be easily coded one into another. 1 
6. UNDECIDABILITY RESULTS 
Here we shall show that the validity problem of PPDL > r is 
undecidable. We shall show also that the set of valid formulas of PPDL > r 
is not recursively enumerable, and then there is no recursive axiomatization 
for the PPDL > r (as in the case of first order predicate calculi of finite 
models). 
DEFINITION 6.1. Following Paz ( 1971) we define a probabilistic 
automaton over a finite alphabet Z as A = {T-C, S, A(cJ),,~, F], where S is 
a finite set of states, rt is some initial distribution on S, A(a) is a Markov 
matrix of transient probabilities ISI x ISI associated with g EC, and FE S 
is a set of terminating states. For a word o from Z,f”(w) is the probability 
that the automaton A accepts o. We define a P-event as in Paz (1971)-for 
a probabilistic automaton A with rational probabilities and a rational 
number %, an event [r] = {w E C*: f”(o) > I*}. 
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PROPOSITION 6.2. For a P-event [T] from Definition 6.1 we can con- 
struct recursively a formula cp from PPDL such that + pr cp iff [T] = 0. 
Proof If for a P-event [T] S = {s, , ..,, s, 1, 71 = (x,, . . . . n,), C = 
(0 1, ..., o,], A(a,) = (ri), we take the propositional variables S,, . . . . S,, for 
the states, Q for the program termination, and P,, . . . . P, for the letters of 
the alphabet, a program variable CI, and write the following expressions of 
PPDL: 
5 d;f (when . . . 
P,&Si: S;:=false; (ri,S, :=trueu I.. urj,S, :=true); 
. 
otherwise false?) (here 1 <ldk, 1 bi<n). 
This 5 defines one execution step of a probabilistic automaton A. It 
changes states (the values of Si) depending on the chosen letter of the 
alphabet (P,). The operator when does not appear in our language, but it 
may be easily expressed by the operators if else. 
fi d~c (S, := false; . . . . S, := false; 
(nlS, := trueu ... u x,,S, := true); while Q (a; 5)) 
This /? defines the execution of a probabilistic automaton A. In the 
beginning the initial state was chosen with the right distribution; after 
that the program c1 walks to some letter from the alphabet (Pi) and 
(possibly) the end of the word (1 Q). The changing of states is done by the 
program 5. 
*,l(~*>o v P,, & P,>-see Definition 3.1 for cr*. 
l<l,</!<k 
This ii, says that 51 almost never chooses two letters in the same time. 
And now we can already define 
We want to prove that this cp defines what we want. First of all, if 
[T] # @, then for some word o from the alphabet f”(w) > 2. Then we 
construct a model of PPDL consisting of the prefixes of the word o (they 
will be the states of the model). The value of P, will be true if and only if 
the last letter of a word is G,. The program variable a will add one letter 
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to a word (if it is possible) with probability 1. And the value of Q will be 
false only on w  itself. Then we prove that in this model n k lcp (.4 is the 
empty word). 
Otherwise, suppose that in some model A4 for some state I k 1 cp. Then 
we define a function g on the words from C* (an event from Paz, 1971): 
for a word w  = crII . (T,~ we define a program term 
CI,,, syr (Q?; cr; P,, ?; . . . Q?; E; P,?; 7 Q?), and then we define 
We prove that CUE=* g(w)< 1, and that 
fJ <f#) U US8 
( > 
= Jy gwXf%) 
s,t F OJ‘Zz* 
So there exists a word w  such that ,f”(~) > ,?. 1 
Remark. Here we used global assignments to propositional variables in 
order to express emptiness of P-event. If we do not want assignments, we 
have to be a bit more sophisticated: 
PROPOSITION 6.3. For a P-event [T] from Definition 6.1 we can con- 
struct recursively a formula cp without assignment and probabilistic choice 
(from PPDL,,, > r) such that k pr cp iff [T] = a. 
Proof The construction and the proof are very similar to those from 
Proposition 6.2. First of all we note that the common case of the problem 
of emptiness can be reduced to that of 7c, = 1, rri = 0 for i# 1, S, $ F (add 
some new state S, and as the first step pass from it to some other state 
Sj+ , with probability 7-r;). Because we do not want assignments we use the 
same program variable c1 for changing of states as well as for choosing 
letters of the alphabet. We define 
fl zf (while Q a) 
$,&*I 22 1 (PI, & P,J & & l(Si& Sj) 
l</,<l><k l<i<,<n 
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Here [a*] cp means “for iterations of M there will almost always be cp.” 
We have some difficulties here because the expression of * needs 
assignments, but we can always express [a*]q by an equivalent formula 
1 (while cp a > 0 true. 
The proof is similar to that in Proposition 6.2. If [r] # a, we construct 
the same model as in 6.2, but we take as a the program term (a; 0 from 
Proposition 6.2 for M ‘, For Z + lcp we define 
a o zr (Q?; a; PI,?; ... Q?; a; P,?; lQ?) and g(w) z=f,,(Z)(O). 
And now we prove, as in 6.2, that C, EZ* g(w) 6 1, and that 
B c g(o)xfA(W). 
we,?T* 
So there exists a word o such that f”(o) > %. 1 
PROPOSITION 6.4. For a P-event [IT] from Definition 6.1 we can 
construct recursively a formula cp without assignments and nesting (from 
PPDL > r,,J such that k pr q iff [T] = 0. 
Proof: The construction and the proof are standard. The formulas and 
the program terms we build are similar to those used in Proposition 6.2. 
Because the lack of assignments we shall use a program variable ai for 
choosing a letter of an alphabet as well as for changing a state to Sj. We 
define 
&j dyr (when ... 
P,&Si: (rf,(a,; S,?)u ... ~&(a,; S,?)); 
. . . 
otherwise false?), where 1 <I<k, 1 di<n. 
After that we define 
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and 
The proof is similar to that in Proposition 6.3. 
THEOREM 6.5. The set of valid formulas of PPDL > r is not recursively 
enumerable. Moreover, the set of valid formulas of PPDL > rXlz and the set 
of valid formulas of PPDL > r,,, are not recursively enumerable too. 
Proof: We can see that the set of P-events generating empty language 
is not recursively enumerable: easily, the set of P-events generating non- 
empty language is recursively enumerable (search a word o with 
fA(o) > A), and the problem of emptiness is not decidable (see Paz ( 1971)). 
Thus the theorem follows directly from Propositions 6.3 and 6.4. 1 
We shall write down useful corollaries from Theorem 6.5. 
COROLLARY 6.6. The validity problem of PPDL > rs10 is exactly IT:. It 
follows immediately from Theorem 4.13 (existence of a finite rational model), 
Proposition 4.2 (recursivity of truth of a finite formula in a finite model ), and 
Theorem 6.5 (undecidability of validity problem ). 
COROLLARY 6.7. There is no recursive proof system (axioms, inference 
rules, etc.) for PPDL > r (for PPDL > rxlz, for PPDL > r.XY,). Existence of 
such a proof system implies recursive enumerability of the set of validformulas. 
COROLLARY 6.8. The DPPDL encriched by probabilistic choice is 
undecidable. Moreover, there is no recursive proof system for this logic. 
Proof We can interpret PPDL > rOIO recursively in this logic (see 
Theorem 5.4). 1 
The interesting question is what happens if we take a sublogic of 
PPDL > r which is less expressive than PPDL > r.Vlz or PPDL > r.Xr,. 
Sometimes we can prove decidability of such logic. 
PROPOSITION 6.9. The intersection of PPDL > rXl,, with PPDL > rxo,, 
i.e., the logic PPDL > r,oo, is decidable. 
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ProoJ: This logic is recursively interpretable in the decidable 
DPPDL,,, (see Theorem 5.4 and Proposition 5.5). 1 
APPENDIX: UNDECIDABILITY OF THE LOGIC OF INEQUALITIES 
The decidable logic proposed in the work of Kozen (1985) is the logic 
of a single inequality f < g, where f and g are arithmetic expressions built 
from measurable characteristic functions of sets and measurable function 
transformers defined by a program. Such an inequality is valid in a model 
if it is true pointwise. Naturally, we can extend this logic by allowing 
inequalities of the shape f < g and boolean combinations of inequalities. 
Note, that in this logic the expression f < g v g <f is not always valid. 
Moreover, it is not equivalent to the valid expression f < g v lf < g. 
Here we shall show that the validity problem of boolean combinations 
of inequalities is undecidable. We shall interpret the undecidable validity 
problem of PPDL,,, > r, the logic with nested probabilistic estimations, in 
this extension of the logic of inequalities. Given a formula $ in 
PPDL,,, > r, we change the propositional variables to the measurable 
characteristic function variables from Kozen (1985). The logical connec- 
tives are changed to the arithmetic ones in the standard way: -IA is 
translated to 1 -A, and A & B to A x B. Then we replace inductively, 
bottom-up, every subformula of $ of the form (CI) Iv, where CI and cp do 
not contain diamonds and 3. < 1, by a new propositional variable Ai, 
adding at each step two inequalities: 
(1) (l-Ai)x(cc)cp61x(1-A,)-“Ai= implies i(a)@ in 
PPDL,” 
(2) (l-A;)+(cc)cp>Axl-“Ai= implies (a)lqinPPDL.” 
We denote by 5 the conjunction of all of these inequalities. Now, the for- 
mula $ will become an arithmetic expression Ic/‘, and it will be equivalent 
to one additional equality II/‘= 1. 
The formula 5 I $’ = 1 is valid in a model of the logic from Kozen 
(1985) for any values of the additional predicates Ai if and onfy if a formula 
$ is valid in this model as a model of PPDL. Moreover, for a PPDL model 
where all the program variables are “total, ” i.e., the measure of the domain 
is always 1, a formula $ is valid in this model if and only if the formula 
c =) II/’ = 1 is valid in this model as a model of the logic from Kozen (1985) 
for any values of the additional predicates Ai. Note also that the difficulty 
that all the program variables in Kozen (1985) are total can be easily 
eliminated by changing a program variable pi to the program term pi; Ql?, 
where Qi is a new propositional variable. 
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